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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DUE PROCESS Is NOT VIOLATED WHEN PROS-
ECUTOR CARRIES OUT THREAT TO BRING INCREASED CHARGES AFTER
DEFENDANT REFUSES TO PLEAD GUILTY DURING PLEA BAR-
GAINING SESSION.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes (U.S. 1978)
Following an indictment by a Kentucky grand jury, Paul Lewis Hayes
was arraigned for forgery of a check in the amount of $88.30. 1 During a
pretrial conference, the prosecutor offered to recommend a five year prison
term if Hayes would plead guilty, 2 but advised Hayes that he would also be
charged under Kentucky's habitual criminal statute if he refused to plead
guilty. 3 After the defendant insisted upon a full trial, the prosecutor pro-
ceeded to obtain a second indictment which charged Hayes as an habitual
offender. 4 Subsequently, Hayes was found guilty of the forgery offense and
a mandatory life sentence was imposed pursuant to the habitual criminal
statute. 5
1. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 43 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). The offense of uttering a forged instrument was punishable by
confinement for two to ten years. 434 U.S. at 358, citing KY. REV. STAT. § 431.130 (1973)
(current version at Ky. REX. STAT. §§ 516.020-.030 (1975)).
2. 547 F.2d at 43. It should be noted that Hayes' counsel was also present at the confer-
ence. 434 U.S. at 358.
3. 547 F.2d at 42 & n.1, 43. At the time of Hayes' conviction, Kentucky law provided for a
mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for any person convicted of three felonies. See KY.
REV. STAT. § 431.190 (1973) (current version at KY. REV. STAT. § 532.080 (Int. Supp. 1977)).
Under the present habitual offender statute, a persistent felony offender could be sentenced to
a maximum of 20 years imprisonment. KY. REV. STAT. § 532.080(6)(b) (Int. Supp. 1977). The
current statute also requires the imposition of a prison sentence of at least one year for each of
the two prior felony convictions. Id. § 532.080(3)(a). Additionally, the offender must have been
over 18 years of age when the prior offenses were committed, or have been on probation or
parole when the offense was committed, and must have completed service of the prior sentence
within five years of the date the current offense was committed, or have been on probation or
parole when the offense was committed, or have been discharged from probation or parole
within five years of its commission. Id. § 532.080 (3)(a)-(c).
In 1961, at the age of 17, Hayes pleaded guilty to a charge of detaining a female and
served five years in the state reformatory. 434 U.S. at 359 n.3. In 1970, Hayes was convicted of
robbery and sentenced to another five year term, but was released immediately on probation.
Id. Under the current statute, Hayes could not have been subjected to the enhanced sentencing
"because none of [the statute's] conditions were satisfied." 547 F.2d at 42 n.I. See 434 U.S. at
359 n.3.
After the forgery conviction, the terms of the plea bargain were described during cross-
examination of Hayes at subsequent trial proceedings on the habitual offender charge, when the
prosecutor asked:
"Isn't it a fact that I told you at that time (the initial bargaining session) that if you did not
intend to plead guilty to five years for this charge and . . . save the court the inconveni-
ence and necessity of a trial and taking tip this time that I intended to return to the grand
jury and ask them to indict you based upon these prior felony convictions?"
Id. at 358 n.1.
4. 547 F.2d at 43. On appeal, the Supreme Court indicated: "It is not disputed ... that
Hayes' refusal to plead guilty to the original charge was what led to his indictment tinder the
habitual criminal statute." 434 U.S. at 359.
5. 547 F.2d at 43. After returning a guilty verdict on the forgery charge, the jury, in a
separate proceeding, found that Hayes had been convicted of two prior felonies. 434 U.S. at
359. See note 3 supra.
(142)
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The Kentucky Court of Appeals, rejecting Hayes' constitutional objec-
tions, held that the prosecutor's decision to indict Hayes as an habitual of-
fender was a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial leverage in the plea bar-
gaining process. 6  On a petition for habeas corpus relief, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky also concluded that the
action of the prosecutor was constitutional. 7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in reversing the decision of the district court,'
found that a "potential for impermissible vindictiveness exists when a pros-
ecutor is allowed to bring an habitual offender indictment against a defen-
dant who has refused to plead guilty to an indictment for the same unen-
hanced substantive offense," 9 and thus held that Hayes' due process rights 10
had been violated.11  On writ of certiorari, 12 the United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that due process is not violated whenever a pros-
ecutor, after threatening to indict a defendant on a more serious charge if
he should refuse to plead guilty to a lesser offense, obtains such an addi-
tional indictment. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
The use of plea bargaining in criminal cases has become "a persuasive
practice" in which a prosecutor, in return for a plea of guilty, may promise
"to reduce charges, to dismiss charges, not to charge other offenses, or to
seek or obtain a certain sentence." 13 The Supreme Court of the United
6. 434 U.S. at 359. The opinion of the Kentucky Court of Appeals was not published. Id.
7. 547 F.2d at 43. The district court first referred the petition to a magistrate to determine
whether leave to proceed in forma pauperis should be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 1915(a)
(1976). 547 F.2d at 42-43. While finding that Hayes' claims were not so frivolous that leave
should not be granted, the magistrate nonetheless concluded that the petitioner's claims were
"patently without merit," and recommended dismissal of the petition. Id. at 43. In an unpub-
lished decision, the district court adopted these recommendations and dismissed the petition.
Id. The court concluded that the mandatory life sentence was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment, and that Hayes had not been arbitrarily prosecuted as an habitual criminal. Id.
8. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub non. Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
9. 547 F.2d at 44.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... .. Id.
11. 547 F.2d at 45. The case was remanded by the Sixth Circuit upon an order to discharge
Hayes, except for imprisonment for the forgery offense. Id.
12. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 431 U.S. 953 (1977). Hayes' motion to proceed in forma
pauperis was also granted. Id.
13. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.1(b), Commentary at 60-61 (App.
Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]. These standards are set forth in part as
follows:
3.1 Propriety of plea discussions and plea agreements.
(b) The prosecuting attorney, in reaching a plea agreement, may agree to one or
more of the following, as dictated by the circumstances of the individual case:
(i) to make or not to oppose favorable recommendations as to the sentence which
should be imposed if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere;
(ii) to seek or not to oppose dismissal of the offense charged if the defendant enters a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere to another offense reasonably related to defendant's
conduct; or
(iii) to seek or not to oppose dismissal of other charges or potential charges against
the defendant if the defendant enters a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
Id. §3.1(b), Commentary at 60. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure contain similar provi-
1978-1979]
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States has recognized this procedure as "an essential component of the ad-
ministration of justice." 14 Since the defendant, in pleading guilty, waives
many constitutional rights, 15 there must be adequate assurances that the
waivers are "voluntary" and "knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." 16 The
sions prescribing the permissible scope of the federal prosecutor's authority during plea negotia-
tions. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(e)1. For a discussion of the various types of plea bargaining, see
Beall, Principles of Plea Bargaining, 9 Loy. CnI. L.J. 175, 175-77 (1977).
14. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). The Supreme Court further stated
that "[p]roperly administered, [plea bargaining] is to be encouraged." Id. For many years, plea
bargaining was considered "a sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and deliberately concealed
by participating defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges." Blackledge v. Alli-
son, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977) (footnote omitted). The Blackledge Court indicated its approval of
plea bargaining in Santobello, where any "lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the practice
were finally dispelled." Id. (footnote omitted).
The advantages of plea bargaining to all parties have frequently been acknowledged.
See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. at 261; Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 743, 752
(1970); United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940, 948 (4th Cir. 1969); ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 13, at 1-3. In support of the practice of plea bargaining, the Supreme Court has recently
stated:
The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties
of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt,
and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges
and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the
risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while await-
ing completion of criminal proceedings.
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. at 71 (footnote omitted).
Some commentators, however, have disputed the validity of the plea bargaining process.
For example, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has
recommended that all plea negotiations should be prohibited by 1978. NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS, Standard 3.1 (1973). See
generally Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining, 62 A.B.A.J. 621 (1976); Note, The Uncon-
stitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1395-411 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining]. For a proposal suggesting the adoption of a charge
setting hearing, see Parnas & Atkins, Abolishing Plea Bargaining: A Proposal, 14 GRIM. L.
BULL. 101 (1978). For an informative discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of plea
bargaining, and proposals for its reform, see Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transformation of
the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Transformation of the
Criminal Process].
15. As Justice Douglas has observed, "a guilty plea ... constitutes a waiver of the funda-
mental rights to a jury trial, . . to confront one's accusers, . . . to present witnesses in one's
defense, . . . to remain silent .... and to be convicted by proof beyond all reasonable doubt."
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
In addition to constitutional rights, the defendant may also waive several statutory and judicially
created rights. See Borman, The Chilled Right to Appeal From a Plea Bargain Conviction: A
Due Process Cure, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 663, 664 nn.4 & 5 (1974).
16. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (footnote omitted). See also Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S.238, 242-43 (1969); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
One commentator has described these requirements as follows: "To be intelligent, a plea must
be made by a mentally competent defendant who understands both the charges against him and
the consequences of his plea. To be voluntary, a plea must be free of threats or other coercion
that would impermissibly distort the defendant's choice." Note, Rule 11 and Collateral Attacks
on Guilty Pleas, 86 YALE L.J. 1395, 1397-98 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prescribe strict procedural safeguards which
must be complied with before a plea of guilty or nolo contendere can be accepted by the federal
courts. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c), (d), (e), (f). For an analysis of rule 11, see Note, supra, at
[VOL. 24: p. 142
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roles of the prosecutor, 17 the judge,1 8 and the defense counsel 19 must
therefore be examined whenever a defendant is encouraged to plead guilty.
1397-421. For a discussion of the problem of innocent defendants who plead guilty to criminal
charges, see Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries For All Felony and Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas
But Innocent Defendants?, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 88 (1977).
17. It has been generally recognized that "[p]rosecutors must avoid mischarging, over-
charging and threats of heavier sentences for those who do not plead guilty." United States v.
Gallington, 488 F.2d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974) (footnote omit-
ted). One court, however, has stated that in procuring a plea, "[a] threat to prosecute under
state law where the facts warrant prosecution should not be considered as coercive or in-
timidating." Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 1969). See also Barber v.
Gladden, 327 F.2d 101, 104 (9th Cir. 1964). Nonetheless, if the prosecutor's threatened indict-
ment is impermissible: under state and federal law, a guilty plea induced under such cir-
cumstances is involuntary. See Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897, 900, 903 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970) (prosecutor unlawfully threatened to revive charge of secret as-
sault). See also Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973) (holding that a
prosecutor may not, in return for a plea of guilty, promise and/or make a recommendation for
an illegal sentence). Restrictions are also placed on prosecutors by the ALl MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 350(3) (1975), which states in pertinent part:
(3) Improper Pressure. The prosecutor shall not seek to induce a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere by exerting such undue pressures as:
(a) charging or threatening to charge the defendant with a crime not supported
by facts believed by the prosecutor to be provable;
(b) charging or threatening to charge the defendant with a crime not ordinarily
charged in the jurisdiction for the conduct allegedly engaged in by him; or
(c) threatening the defendant that if he pleads not guilty, his sentence may be
more severe than that which is ordinarily imposed in the jurisdiction in similar
cases on defendants who plead not guilty.
Id.
For an interesting discussion of the prosecutor's role in the plea bargaining process, see
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 50, 52-112 (1968). See
also notes 29-39 and accompanying text infra;
18. The role of the judge in the plea bargaining process is severely limited by rule 11(e) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states in part: "The court shall not participate
in any such discussions." FED. R. CraM. P. 11(e). One court, discussing rule 11, concluded that
[jiudges are not to participate in the bargaining; their role is to be limited to acceptance or
"rejection of agreements after a thorough review of all relevant factors." United States v. Gal-
lington, 488 F.2d 637, 640 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907 (1974) (footnote omitted).
But cf. United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721, 725 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 892 (1968) (uncoercive participation by judge in plea negotiations does not in itself render
plea involuntary). In addition, if the court threatens a defendant with a more severe sentence
for his failure to plead guilty, the plea may be deemed involuntary. See Matthews v. United
States, 533 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1976) (dictum), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977). See
generally Gallagher, Judicial Participation In Plea Bargaining: A Search For New Standards, 9
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 29, 38-45 (1974). For discussions urging judicial participation in plea
bargaining, see Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part 1, 76 COLUM. L.
REV. 1059, 1103-54 (1976); Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972).
19. If defense counsel erroneously predicts the sentence to be imposed upon the defendant,
a plea based upon these expectations is not involuntary and cannot be withdrawn. See, e.g.,
Masciola v. United States, 469 F.2d 1057, 1058-59 (3d Cir. 1972); Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d
935, 936 (10th Cir. 1970); Swanson v. United States, 304 F.2d 865, 866 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 894 (1962); Domenica v. United States, 292 F.2d 483, 485 (1st Cir. 1961). Similarly,
counsel's misjudgment as to the admissibility of a confession does not necessarily render the
plea unintelligent. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-71 (1970); Parker v. North
Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 796-98 (1970). Further, an attorney's alleged conflict of interest may not
in itself provide a reason for vacating a plea. See Dukes v. Warden, Conn. State Prison, 406
U.S. 250, 257 (1972). However, defense counsel cannot coerce a plea of guilty by threatening to
withdraw from a case. See Edmonds v. Lewis, 546 F.2d 566, 569 (4th Cir. 1976) (Butzner, J.,
1978-1979]
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The United States Supreme Court has developed certain safeguards to
protect a defendant from judicial and prosecutorial vindictiveness following a
successful challenge to a conviction. 20 In North Carolina v. Pearce,2 1 the
Court examined the constitutional limitations on harsher sentencing on re-
trial of a conviction of the same charges which had been set aside on con-
stitutional grounds.2 2 In Pearce, each defendant had been sentenced to a
longer prison term at a subsequent retrial.2 3 The Court, finding these sen-
tences unconstitutional, determined that "Id]ue process of law, then, re-
quires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfilly attacked
his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new
trial." 24 In order to protect a defendant from any retaliatory motivation on
the part of the sentencing judge at retrial, the Court required that the
judge's reasons for imposing a more lengthy sentence "must affirmatively
appear. Those reasons must be based upon information concerning identifi-
able conduct on the part of the defendant occuring after the time of the
original sentencing proceeding." 2 5
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court clarified that it did not
intend to suggest that due process was "offended by all possibilites of in-
creased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a
realistic likelihood of 'vindictiveness.' "26 The Court, then, did not find a
violation of due process where a higher sentence had been imposed after a
trial de novo in another court. 27 The Court reached the same conclusion
dissenting), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 958 (1977). See generally Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's
Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975).
20. See notes 21-35 and accompanying text infra.
21. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
22. Id. at 713.
23. Id. at 713-14.
24. Id. at 725. Moreover, the Court reasoned that "since the fear of such vindictiveness may
unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his
first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a
retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge." Id. (footnote omitted). The Court
reached this conclusion after rejecting constitutional arguments based upon the double jeopardy
and equal protection clauses. Id. at 717-23, construing U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
In Simpson v, Rice, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), the companion case to Pearce, the defendants
had also received increased sentences on retrial of the same charges. Id. at 726. The Court
limited the defendants' sentences at retrial to the original sentences imposed. Id.
25. 395 U.S. at 726. Furthermore, the Pearce Court directed that "the factual data upon
which the increased sentence is based . . . be made part of the record, so that the constitutional
legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed upon appeal." Id.
26. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974).
27. See Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). In Kentucky, there exists a two-tier sys-
tem under which any person convicted of a misdemeanor, rather than relying exclusively on
ordinary appellate review of the original conviction, may seek a trial de novo in a higher court.
Id. at 113, citing KY. REV. STAT. § 23.032 (1971). Following his conviction on a disorderly
conduct charge and the imposition of a $10 fine, Colten obtained a new trial pursuant to the
Kentucky statute and was fined $50. 407 U.S. at 108. The Court distinguished Pearce, finding
that the hazard of judicial vindictiveness was not inherent in the Kentucky system. Id. at 116. It
reasoned that since the new trial was in a different court, that court would have no reason to act
vindictively toward the defendant. Id. at 117.
[VOL. 24: p. 142
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where a different jury imposed an increased sentence after a conviction on
retrial. 28
Beyond the issue of judicial vindictiveness, the Supreme Court was
confronted with the problem of prosecutorial vindictiveness in Blackledge v.
Perry.29  The defendant in Perry, while in prison, had a fight with an in-
mate and was consequently convicted of a misdemeanor. 30 After the pris-
oner filed for a trial de novo,3 1 the prosecutor obtained a felony indictment
arising out of the same conduct as the prior conviction, and the defendant
pleaded guilty to the charge. 2  Justice Stewart, applying the rationale of
Pearce,33 reasoned that "[a] person convicted of an offense is entitled to
pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the
State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one,
thus subjecting him to significantly increased potential period of incarcera-
28. See Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973). In Chaffin, the defendant was found
guilty of robbery and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Id. at 18. Following the reversal
of the conviction on constitutional grounds, the defendant was retried before a different judge
and jury and was again found guilty. Id. at 19. At retrial, however, the jury returned a sentence
of life imprisonment. Id. Rejecting the defendant's contention that the higher sentence was
invalid under the Pearce rationale, the Court stated: "The potential for such abuse of the sen-
tencing process by the jury is, we think, de ?nininis in a properly controlled retrial." id. at 26.
Since the retrial jury was unaware that the defendant had previously been tried and convicted
of the same offense, the Court found that the jury would have no motive to be vindictive. Id. at
26-27. In addition, "the jury is unlikely to be sensitive to the institutional interests that might
occasion higher sentences by a judge desirous of discouraging what he regards as meritless
appeals." Id. at 27 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the Court rejected the defendant's argument
that harsher sentences on retrial have a "chilling effect" on the defendant's right to appeal. Id.
at 29-35.
In dicta, the Chaffin Court also rejected the possibility of prosecutorial vindictiveness
against the defendant since the death penalty had been sought at both trials. Id. at 27 n.13.
Justice Powell reasoned:
Prosecutors often request more than they can reasonably expect to get, knowing that the
jury will customarily arrive at some compromise sentence. The prosecutor's strategy also
might well vary from case to case depending on such factors as his assessment of the
jury's reaction to the proof and to the testimony of witnesses for and against the State.
Given these practical considerations, and constrained by the bar against his informing the
jury of the facts of prior conviction and sentence, the possibility that a harsher sentence
will be obtained through prosecutorial malice seems remote.
Id. (citation omitted).
29. 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
30. Id. at 22. Perry was tried without a jury and was convicted of assault with a deadly
weapon. Id.
31. Id. at 23. In North Carolina, a two-tier system existed under which a person convicted
in the district court had an absolute right to a trial de novo in the superior court. Id. at 22,
citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-290 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-177.1 (1965)
(repealed 1973). A similar system confronted the Supreme Court in Colten v. Kentucky, 407
U.S. 104 (1972). See note 27 supra.
32. 417 U.S. at 23. Perry was charged with the felony of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill and inflict serious bodily harm. Id.
33. For a discussion of Pearce, see notes 21-25 and accompanying text supra.
1978-1979]
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tion." 4 The Supreme Court thus concluded "that it was not constitution-
ally permissible" for the prosecutor to act in such a vindictive manner.
35
While the principles enunciated by the Court in Pearce and Perry had
not been applied in the context of plea bargaining prior to Bordenkircher,
the vindictiveness analysis has received a rather broad application by the
lower courts. 36  In the pretrial situation, for example, some federal courts
have required that a subsequent indictment be dismissed if the prosecutor
followed through on his threat to bring additional charges against a defen-
dant who had refused to waive his statutory right to a trial by a district
judge. 37 Similarly, where the prosecutor obtained a forty-one count indict-
ment after the defendant's guilty plea to two counts of a four count indict-
ment had been vacated on appeal, the conduct was held violative of the
defendant's due process rights. 3 8  Where the increased counts were those
34. 417 U.S. at 28 (footnote omitted). Justice Stewart reasoned that since a trial de novo
would result in increased work for the prosecutor, the prosecutor could discourage many
defendants from pursuing this relief "by 'upping the ante' through a felony indictment," Id. at
27-28.
35. Id. at 28-29. The Court indicated in dicta that the case would have been very different
"if the State had shown that it was impossible to proceed on the more serious charge at the
outset." Id. at 29 n.7.
36. The rule established in Pearce and Perry
has been applied by the lower courts in a number of circumstances beyond the retrial-af-
ter-appeal situation detailed in the two Supreme Court cases. The rule has been applied
to a wide variety of situations in which courts have detected a significant possibility of
prosecutorial retaliation against defendants who have exercised their rights.
United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp. 808, 812 (D.N.J. 1977). For a discussion of some of these
lower court cases, see notes 37-39 and accompanying text infra.
37. United States v. Lippi, 435 F. Supp. 808, 809-10, 816 (D.N.J. 1977). Although the
prosecutor argued that the new indictment was based upon the discovery of new evidence, the
district court determined that the prosecutor had "failed to carry the burden of dispelling this
appearance of vindictiveness." Id. at 814. The court noted that "the atmosphere of improper
coercion and retaliation" had "infect[ed] this indictment with fatal taint." Id. For other cases
applying the vindictiveness analysis developed in Pearce, see, e.g., United States v. DeMarco,
550 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977) (where prosecutor threatened
additional counts if defendant exercised his right to change of venue, Pearce and Perry were
controlling); United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1369 (9th Cir. 1976) (where
defendant refused to waive the right to trial by jury, and prosecutor then added two felony
counts, the "mere appearance of vindictiveness" placed burden on prosecution to show the
contrary). But see United States v. Sturgill, 563 F.2d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1977) (although two
counts were added after the defendant refused to waive his trial rights, since the government
had filed a notice of intent not to prosecute the count with the longer sentence, due process
was not violated); United States v. Butler, 414 F. Supp. 394, 396 (D. Conn. 1976) (after break-
down in plea negotiations, where second indictment was sought based on acts occurring after
conduct giving rise to original indictment, no potential for vindictiveness existed).
38. United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1171-73 (4th Cir. 1976). The Fourth Circuit
noted that Perry assures a right to appeal without fear of retaliation by the imposition of more
serious charges should the original conviction be reversed. Id. at 1173. Since the prosecutor had
received no new information to support the added counts, "the superseding indictment denied
[the defendant] due process of law." Id. For additional applications of the Perry rule, see
United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (defendant denied due
process when charged with first-degree murder following mistrial on second-degree murder
charge; Pearce and Perry interpreted to require restrictions on increased charges after mistrials);
United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1974) (in a pre-Perry decision, where
defendant withdrew his plea during sentencing and prosecutor then added an additional count
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which were originally waived pursuant to a plea agreement, however, their
subsequent reinstatement has not been considered vindictive. 39
Against this backround, the Supreme Court in Bordenkircher began its
analysis by emphasizing that Hayes, during the plea negotiations, knew that
the prosecutor intended to obtain the recidivist indictment if he did not
plead guilty. 40 Justice Stewart, writing for the Court, determined that "this
case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes as a re-
cidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to drop that charge
as a part of the plea bargain."41  In contrast, the majority noted that the
Sixth Circuit considered the timing of the added indictment to be of critical
importance in determining whether or not prosecutorial vindictiveness was
present. 42 The majority criticized the circuit court for focusing upon the
based upon facts which were known initially, Pearce required its dismissal). But see United
States v. Preciado-Gomez, 529 F.2d 935, 938 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976)
(where facts upon which subsequent indictments were based were unknown or unproved at
time of original indictment, courts should not interfere with prosecutor's rights to press more
serious charges); United States v. Rodriguez, 429 F. Supp. 520, 523-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (bring-
ing of second indictment during pendency of appeal, charging different offenses from those
contained in original indictment, was permissible where government had legitimate and good
faith reasons for delay). For a discussion of a proposed plea bargaining system which might
remove the potential for vindictiveness upon retrial, see Borman, supra note 15, at 694-715.
39. See, e.g., Martinez v. Estelle, 527 F.2d 1330, 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
924 (1976) (where, pursuant to plea agreement, prosecutor waived habitual offender count in
exchange for defendant's waiver of jury trial, but on retrial defendant rejected identical offer,
increased sentence due to conviction on recidivist count was not the result of prosecutorial
vindictiveness); United States v. Anderson, 514 F.2d 583, 588 (7th Cir. 1975) (after guilty plea
was vacated, reinstitution of all initial charges was not retaliatory since the situation reverted to
the preplea stage); Arechiga v. Texas, 469 F.2d 646, 647 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
932 (1973) (where prosecutor originally waived habitual offender charge in exchange for defend-
ant's waiver of jury trial, but on retrial defendant sought a jury trial and recidivist count was
added, vindictiveness was not found since prosecutor's identical offer had been rejected by the
defendant); People v. McCutcheon, 68 Ill. 2d 101, 109, 368 N.E.2d 886, 801 (1977) (when
defendant repudiates guilty plea, prosecution can reinstate charge dismissed pursuant to original
plea bargain).
40. 434 U.S. at 360. Although the prosecutor did not seek the indictment until after the
plea negotiations had ended, his intent was apparent from the outset. Id. Justice Stewart, writ-
ing for the majority, found this factual situation distinguishable from one in which the pros-
ecutor, without notice, brings additional and more serious charges after plea bargaining has
failed. Id.
The Court did not discuss the constitutionality of habitual offender statutes, which have
repeatedly withstood challenges grounded upon principles of double jeopardy, cruel and un-
usual punishment, due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities. See, e.g.,
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1967); Graham v. West Va., 224 U.S. 616, 623-31
(1912); Moore v. Mississippi, 159 U.S. 673, 678 (1895). Recently, these statutes have been
upheld against constitutional challenges that they vest the prosecutor with unlimited discretion
and that their enforcement is unreasonably selective. See Brown v. Parratt, 560 F.2d 303,
303-05 (8th Cir. 1977); Martin v. Parratt, 549 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1977). At least one court,
however, has restricted the application of these statutes where the punishment is excessive and
wholly disproportionate to the offenses charged. See Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 139-43 (4th
Cir. 1973). For a discussion of the arguments against habitual offender statutes, see Brown v.
Parratt, 560 F.2d at 305-09 (Heaney, J., concurring); Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Recon-
sideration, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 99, 105-20 (1971).
41. 434 U.S. at 360-61.
42. Id. at 361, citing 547 F.2d at 44-45. Justice Stewart indicated that the Sixth Circuit had
drawn "a distinction between 'concessions relating to prosecution under an existing indictment,'
1978-1979]
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol24/iss1/8
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
"substance of the plea offer" 43 rather than the circumstances surrounding
the negotiations, such as the presence of counsel, 44 the keeping of a public
record to indicate the voluntariness of the plea, 45 and the performance of all
promises made by the prosecutor during the bargaining process. 46
Reviewing its holdings in Pearce 47 and Perry,as the Court distinguished
the imposition of a penalty upon a defendant who has chosen to attack his
original conviction as "a situation 'very different from the give-and-take
negotiation common in plea bargaining between the prosecution and the
defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargaining power.' " " Jus-
tice Stewart interpreted the earlier cases finding due process violations as
grounded not in a fear that the assertion of legal rights would be inhibited,5 0
but rather in a concern "that the State might be retaliating against the ac-
cused for lawfully attacking his conviction." 51
While acknowledging that punishing a person for doing "what the law
plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort," 52
the Court declared that plea bargaining posed no such threat of retaliation,
since the defendant "is free to accept or reject the prosecutor's offer." 53 As
the court explained, the acceptence of the legitimacy of plea bargaining pre-
cludes the notion that a plea is constitutionally involuntary simply because it
is the result of the bargaining process. 54  Although the Court recognized
and threats to bring more severe charges not contained in the original indictment-a line it
thought necessary in order to establish a prophylactic rule to guard against the evil of pros-
ecutorial vindictiveness." 434 U.S. at 361 (footnote omitted), quoting 547 F.2d at 44. Justice
Stewart further remarked that the Sixth Circuit apparently concluded that a prosecutor acts
vindictively "whenever his charging decision is influenced by what he hopes to gain" from the
plea. 434 U.S. at 361. Moreover, the Court concluded that the Sixth Circuit's determination
that the prosecutor had acted vindictively was based on the prosecutor's admission that the
threatened recidivist indictment was an effort to induce a guilty plea. Id., citing 547 F.2d at 45.
Possible support for the Court's conclusion can be found in the following statement by the Sixth
Circuit: "In this case, a vindictive motive need not be inferred. The prosecutor has admitted
it." 547 F.2d at 45.
43. 434 U.S. at 362, citing 547 F.2d at 45.
44. 434 U.S. at 362, citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
45. 434 U.S. at 362, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
46. 434 U.S. at 362, citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
47. For a discussion of Pearce, see notes 21-25 and accompanying text supra.
48. For a discussion of Perry, see notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra.
49. 434 U.S. at 362, quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted).
50. 434 U.S. at 363, citing Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973); Colten v. Kentucky,
407 U.S. 104 (1972).
51. 434 U.S. at 363.
52. Id., citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 738 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Moreover, the Court stated that "for an agent of the State to
pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is
'patently unconstitutional.' " 434 U.S. at 363, quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32
n.20 (1973), quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 613, 618 (1969).
53. 434 U.S. at 363.
54. Id. The Court, in so concluding, stated that "[d]efendants advised by competent counsel
and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of intelligent choice in
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that a defendant faced with the possibility of harsher punishment may be
discouraged from asserting his trial rights, it nevertheless concluded that this
choice was a permissible aspect of a system which utilizes plea bargain-
ing.55  Furthermore, Justice Stewart recognized "the simple reality" that in
bargaining with the defendant, the prosecutor's objective is to persuade him
to forego his right to plead not guilty. 56
Emphasizing that Hayes was properly chargeable under the recidivist
statute, the Court noted that the decision whether or not to prosecute and
what charge to file generally rests within the prosecutor's discretion.5 7 The
majority reasoned that "some selectivity in enforcement" does not violate the
Constitution as long as the prosecutor acted within the limits established by
the legislative definition of the offense and "the selection was (not) deliber-
ately based upon an unjustifiable standard." 58  Moreover, the Court indi-
cated that a rigid rule prohibiting "a prosecutor from acting forthrightly in
his dealings with the defense could only invite unhealthy subterfuge that
would drive the practice of plea bargaining back into the shadows from
which it has so recently emerged." 59
Limiting its holding to "the course of conduct engaged in by the pros-
ecutor in this case," the Court found that there had been no due process
violation,6 0 but that the defendant had only been faced "with the unpleasant
alternatives of foregoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly sub-
ject to prosecution." 6 1
Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, urged that the Court's deci-
sion in Pearce and Perry required afflrmance of the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion. 62 The dissent maintained that due process seemingly mandates "that
response to prosecutorial persuasion, and [are] unlikely to be driven to false self-condemnation."
Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stewart further noted that a plea could be induced simply by the
defendant's fear of more severe punishment upon conviction at trial. Id.
55. Id. at 364, citing Chaflin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973). The "trial rights"
referred to by the Chaffin Court included the defendant's right to a jury trial and the right to
plead not guilty. 412 U.S. at 30.
56. 434 U.S. at 364.
57. Id. However, Justice Stewart recognized that "there are undoubtedly constitutional
limits" on the discretion vested in the prosecutor. Id. at 365.
58. Id. at 364, quoting Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). The Court concluded that
a prosecutor's desire to induce a guilty plea, unlike charging decisions based upon considera-
tions of "race, religion, or other arbitrary classification," did not constitute an "unjustifiable
standard." 434 U.S. at 364-65, quoting Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962).
59. 434 U.S. at 365 (citation omitted). See note 14 supra.
60. 434 U.S. at 365.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 365-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in this
opinion. Justice Blackmun reasoned that although the majority limited its holding to the particu-
lar factual situation presented, the decision was either "departing from, or at least restricting
the principles" enunciated in Pearce and Perry. Id. Since the prosecutor admitted that his
reason for seeking the recidivist indictment was to discourage Hayes from exercising his right to
trial, Justice Blackmun argued that vindictiveness must be present to the same extent as in
those cases. Id. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded that even if the pros-
ecutor's motives had not been apparent, "when plea negotiations, conducted in the face of the
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the prosecution justify its action on some basis other than discouraging" the
defendant's right to trial.6 3  Justice Blackmun thus asserted that
"[pirosecutorial vindictiveness in any context is still prosecutorial vindictive-
ness," which is prohibited by the due process clause. 6 4
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, after reviewing the
facts of Hayes' prior felony convictions, urged that the question to be
answered was whether the prosecution might have reasonably charged
Hayes initially as an habitual offender. 65 Noting that the prosecutor must
have initially determined that it was not in the public interest to charge
Hayes under the habitual offender statute, 6 6 Justice Powell concluded that
the prosecutor's subsequent actions were "calculated solely to deter the
less serious charge under the first indictment, fail, charging by a second indictment a more
serious charge for the same conduct creates 'a strong inference' of vindictiveness." Id., quoting
547 F.2d at 45.
63. 434 U.S. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun required this element of
justification because the prosecutor must have determined that it was not in the public interest
to charge Hayes initially with the more serious offense. Id.
64. Id. at 368 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun argued that the
majority's "holding gives plea bargaining full sway despite vindictiveness." Id. A contrary hold-
ing, it was suggested, would require that the prosecutor bring the more severe charge initially.
Id. Although the accused would then "bargain against a greater charge, face the likelihood of
increased bail, and run the risk that the court would be less inclined to accept a bargained
plea," it would be "far preferable to hold the prosecution to the charge it was originally content
to bring." Id. Noting that prosecutors may bring charges "more serious than they think appro-
priate for the ultimate disposition of a case in order to gain bargaining leverage with a defend-
ant," Justice Blackmun remarked that the Court has never openly sanctioned such practices.
Id. at 368 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent, however, suggested that even if such
"overcharging is to be sanctioned," the more serious charge should be brought initially, "rather
than as a filliped threat at the end." Id. Justice Blackmun maintained that this would require
that the prosecutor charge without any knowledge of the defendant's willingness to plead guilty.
Id. Thus, a defendant who is innocent would not "be subject to quite such a devastating gam-
ble," since he could go to trial without fear of retaliation. Id. The dissent further argued that
such a requirement would make the charging practices more visible to the public, and political
bodies could then evaluate the fairness of the prosecutor's actions. Id.
65. Id. at 369-71 (Powell, J., dissenting). Although neither of Hayes' prior convictions had
resulted in imprisonment, Justice Powell noted that the addition of a conviction on charges
involving the $88.30 check subjected Hayes to a mandatory life sentence under the recidivist
statute. Id. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting). As the dissent observed: "Persons convicted of rape
and murder often are not punished so severely." Id. Justice Powell further noted the pros-
ecutor's conceded purpose was to discourage Hayes' assertion of his constitutional rights. id.
66. Id. at 371 (Powell, J., dissenting). While noting that courts would probably accord def-
erence to the decision of the prosecutor to charge Hayes initially as a recidivist, Justice Powell
argued that
the prosecutor evidently made a reasonable, responsible judgment not to subject an indi-
vidual to a mandatory life sentence when his only new offense had societal implications as
limited as those accompanying the uttering of a single $88 forged check and when the
circumstances of his prior convictions confirmed the inappropriateness of applying the
habitual criminal statute. I think it may be inferred that the prosecutor himself deemed it
unreasonable and not in the public interest to put this defendant in jeopardy of a sen-
tence of life imprisonment.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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exercise of constitutional rights," which was considered an impermissible
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 67
Although the Bordenkircher majority reasoned that there is no distinc-
tion between the prosecutor seeking an indictment initially on a more seri-
ous charge and then offering concessions, and threatening to indict on the
more serious charge if the accused refuses to plead guilty to a lesser of-
fense, 68 it is submitted that this analysis is inconsistent with the Court's
earlier decisions. In Perry, the Supreme Court found the potential for pros-
ecutorial vindictiveness when increased charges were brought after the de-
fendant filed for an appeal. 69  It is suggested that Hayes' refusal to plead
guilty in Bordenkircher and his subsequent indictment and conviction on the
habitual offender charges presents an analogous situation. 70  Although the
Bordenkircher majority argued that when the prosecutor brought charges
was insignificant, the Perry Court suggested that the case would have been
distinguishable if the charges could not have been brought initially.71 Even
67. Id. at 373 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell acknowledged that there may be situa-
tions in which a prosecutor would be justified in seeking a new indictment on a more serious
charge, especially when it "would have been reasonable and in the public interest initially to
have charged the defendant with the greater offense." Id. at 371-72 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Under such circumstances, Justice Powell agreed with the majority that "the situation would not
differ materially from one in which the higher charge was brought at the outset." Id. at 372
(Powell, J., dissenting), citing 434 U.S. at 360-61.
Moreover, the dissent suggested that a court would not be inclined to inquire into the
prosecutor's motive for seeking a "harsher indictment." 434 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting).
In the instant case, however, Justice Powell argued that such an inquiry was unnecessary be-
cause the prosecutor had acknowledged his motive. Id., Justice Powell thus viewed the pros-
ecutor's conduct as falling within the ambit of earlier Supreme Court pronouncements which
recognized that "if the only objective of a state practice is to discourage the assertion of con-
stitutional rights it is 'patently unconstitutional.' " Id. quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412
U.S. 17, 32 n.20 (1973), quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969). Furthermore,
Justice Powell noted the distinction between the situation presented in Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742 (1970), and a "situation where the prosecutor or judge, or both, deliberately
employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a plea
of guilty." 434 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting), quoting 397 U.S. at 751 n.8. In Brady, the
defendant inititally pleaded not guilty to a kidnapping charge. 397 U.S. at 743. "Upon learning
that his codefendant, who had confessed . . ., would plead guilty and be available to testify
against him," the defendant decided to plead guilty. Id. The trial judge accepted the defend-
ant's plea only after having questioned"him twice regarding the voluntariness of the plea. Id.
Defendant was represented by competent counsel throughout these proceedings. Id.
Finally, Justice Powell recognized the essential function of plea bargaining and noted
that prosecutors had to be given broad discretion in the negotiating process. 434 U.S. at 372
(Powell, J., dissenting). Since a defendant is usually represented by counsel, Justice Powell
stated that "[o]nly in the most exceptional case should a court conclude that the scales of the
bargaining are so unevenly balanced as to arouse suspicion." Id. In the present case, however,
since the prosecutor admitted that his objective was to discourage Hayes from exercising his
constitutional rights, Justice Powell concluded that Hayes was denied due process. Id. at 372-73
(Powell, J., dissenting).
68. 434 U.S. at 361. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
69. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 22-23 (1974). See notes 29-32 and accompanying text
supra.
70. See notes 1-4 and accompanying text supra.
71. Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29 n.7 (1974) (dictum). The Perry Court explained
that such a situation would exist where the more serious crime was not complete at the time of
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if one were to ignore this distinction in timing, it is submitted that the
prosecutor should be required to justify his actions. As Justice Blackmun
observed, due process seems to "require that the prosecution justify its ac-
tion on some basis other than discouraging respondent from the exercise of
his right to a trial." 72 Since the Pearce Court insisted that a judge's reasons
for increasing a sentence upon retrial must be apparent, 73 similar justifica-
tions should be required of a prosecutor.
This approach has apparently been adopted by the lower federal
courts. 74  For example, where, after a mistrial following a second-degree
murder conviction, the prosecutor brought a first-degree murder charge
against the defendant, the District of Columbia Circuit has required that the
prosecutor's reasons and the factual bases for increasing the charge to a more
serious offense must appear. 75  Similarly, in a factual situation closely paral-
leling Bordenkircher, where increased charges were brought after the de-
fendant refused to waive his right to trial before a district judge or federal
jury, the Ninth Circuit imposed upon the prosecution the burden of proving
that any increase in charges was not motivated by vindictiveness. 76  The
Sixth Circuit in Bordenkircher had also concluded that the prosecutor should
justify his action, 77 since by initially obtaining a less severe indictment, he
had made a "discretionary determination that the interests of the State are
served by not seeking more serious charges.'" 71 It is therefore submitted
that the prosecutor, absent a sufficient justification for imposing a more seri-
ous charge, should be limited to the charges contained in the initial indict-
ment.
It is further suggested that the majority in Bordenkircher adopted too
simplistic an approach to the procedure of plea bargaining. The Court, rec-
the initial indictment, as when an assault victim dies and the defendant is subsequently charged
with homicide. Id. Another possible situation excusing the delay would be that all the facts had
not been discovered prior to the first indictment. See United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407,
416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
72. 434 U.S. at 367 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 63 supra. Justice
Powell suggested a similar analysis in Bordenkircher. 434 U.S. at 372 (Powell, J., dissenting).
While recognizing that courts would not be inclined to inquire into a prosecutor's motive for
obtaining a more serious indictment, Justice Powell argued that when a prosecutor has clearly
admitted that his objective was to discourage the defendant from exercising his constitutional
rights, due process has been denied. Id. See note 67 supra.
73. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 726 (1969). See note 25 and accompanying text
supra.
74. See notes 75 & 76 and accompanying text infra.
75. United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 409, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Jamison
court, noting that the record did not disclose the reason why the first-degree charges had not
been brought initially, found that the defendant had been denied due process. Id. at 417. The
indictments for first-degree murder were subsequently dismissed. Id.
76. United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1976). The court
indicated that "the mere appearance of vindictiveness is enough to place the burden on the
prosecution." Id. at 1369 (emphasis in original). See also United States v. Johnson, 537 F.2d
1170, 1173 (4th Cir. 1976) (defendant need not prove he was an actual victim of retaliation, but
need only show fear or apprehension of vindictiveness).
77. 547 F.2d at 45.
78. Id. at 44.
[VOL. 24: p. 142
13
Jasons: Criminal Procedure - Due Process is Not Violated When Prosecutor
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ognizing that "the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are
important components of this country's criminal justice system," 79 viewed
plea bargaining as a "give-and-take" situation. 80 As one commentator has
observed, however, "[flear of [a] heavier sentence after retrial and deference
to advice of defense counsel might lead defendants to accept virtually all
plea agreements." 81 Moreover, since the majority of all plea negotiations are
carried on between the prosecutor and the defense attorney in the absence
of the defendant,8 2  it is quite conceivable that time demands may not per-
mit an attorney to pursue the most advantageous bargain for his client.8 3
With these considerations in mind, it is doubtful whether, as the majority
states, the defendant is truly "free to accept or reject the prosecution's
offer." 84
Furthermore, it is submitted that this decision has severely restricted
the applicability of Pearce 85 and Perry .s6  The vindictiveness analysis in these
cases would seem to require a different conclusion since, as one lower court
has explained, "the evil to which Pearce is directed is the apprehension on
the defendant's part of receiving a vindictively-imposed penalty for the asser-
tion of rights." 87 The Court's attempt to distinguish a plea bargaining situa-
tion does not withstand analysis where, as in Bordenkircher, the prosecutor
79. 434 U.S. at 361-62, quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
80. 434 U.S. at 362, quoting Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 809 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See text accompanying note 49 supra.
81. Transformation of the Criminal Process, supra note 14, at 579 (footnote omitted).
82. See id. at 578. The author observed that since prosecutors dislike tripartite negotiations,
they would rather confer solely with the defense attorney, with whom they have greater rap-
port. Id. See also Alschuler, supra note 18, at 1135.
83. See Transfornation of the Criminal Process, supra note 14, at 578. It has been stated
that "[p]ublic defenders, by persuading their clients to plead guilty, can relieve the burden of
heavy caseloads and maintain rapport with prosecutors with whom they work repeatedly." Id.
(footnotes omitted). See Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, supra note 14, at 1390. The
Supreme Court has indicated that in determining the validity of a plea conviction, a federal
court must inquire "whether the guilty plea had been made intelligently and voluntarily with
the advice of competent counsel." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 265 (1973) (emphasis
added). It is questionable whether this is an adequate safeguard to ensure that a defendant is
receiving the most propitious bargain. The Bordenkircher Court, however, was convinced that
competent counsel and procedural safeguards adequately protect the defendant during the plea
bargaining process. 434 U.S. at 363. See note 54 supra.
One commentator has urged that all defendants should be allowed to attend plea bar-
gaining sessions. Alschuler, supra note 18, at 1135-36. The presence of the defendant would
hopefully "encourage more vigorous advocacy on the part of defense attorneys and discourage
the deprecating banter, the invocation of improper considerations, and the granting of improper
favors that may sometimes occur between friends." Id. at 1135. Although this may discourage
some beneficial exchanges, the author's position is that the ultimate choice of how to proceed
must be left with the defendant. Id. at 1136.
84. 434 U.S. at 363.
85. For a discussion of Pearce, see notes 21-25 and accompanying text supra.
86. For a discussion of Perry, see notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra.
87. United States v. Jamison, 505 F.2d 407, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (emphasis in original). For
a discussion of Jamison, see note 75 and accompanying text supra. See also United States v.
Johnson, 537 F.2d 1170, 1173 (4th Cir. 1976).
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has virtually admitted a retaliatory motive.8s It is submitted that vindic-
tiveness does not disappear merely because the defendant knew about the
possibility of a recidivist charge before entering a plea. 89 When, after the
failure of plea bargaining, the prosecutor follows through on his threat to
bring a recidivist charge, the inevitable conclusion must be that the pros-
ecutor had a retaliatory purpose. 90
The impact of the decision in Bordenkircher will depend upon whether
or not the lower courts recognize that the Court's holding was limited to
"that course of conduct engaged in by the prosecutor in this case." 91 It is
submitted, however, that as a result of this decision, the lower courts will
restrict their application of the doctrine of prosecutorial vindictiveness.
Catherine N. Jasons
88. See 434 U.S. at 361 n.7, citing 547 F.2d at 45. The Sixth Circuit had concluded: "In this
case, a vindictive motive need not be inferred. The prosecutor has admitted it." 547 F.2d at 45.
See notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text supra.
89. See 434 U.S. at 367-68 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
90. In Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973), the Supreme Court, in finding a de
minimis potential for vindictiveness, had especially noted that
[als was true in Colten, the second sentence is not meted out by the same judicial author-
ity whose handling of the prior trial was suficiently unacceptable to have required a
reversal of the conviction. Thus, the jury, unlike the judge who has been reversed, will
have no personal stake in the prior conviction and no motivation to engage in self-
vindication.
Id. at 27, citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). For a discussion of these cases, see
notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that these same considerations
should apply in the instant case, in which the same prosecutor obtained both indictments.
91. 434 U.S. at 365. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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